Dealing with the Asian crisis: IMF conditionality and implications in Asia and beyond. by Nunnenkamp, Peter
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nunnenkamp, Peter
Article
Dealing with the Asian crisis: IMF
conditionality and implications in Asia
and beyond
Intereconomics
Suggested citation: Nunnenkamp, Peter (1998) : Dealing with the Asian crisis: IMF conditionality
and implications in Asia and beyond, Intereconomics, ISSN 0020-5346, Vol. 33, Iss. 2, pp.
64-72, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/1742IMF
Peter Nunnenkamp*
Dealing with the Asian Crisis
IMF Conditionality and Implications in Asia and Beyond
Analysts broadly agree on the causes of recent crises in East Asia. Nevertheless,
deep controversy exists on appropriate therapy. Especially the International
Monetary Fund is under attack. The way of dealing with financial turbulence may have
important repercussions on countries within and outside Asia.
Risks for the world economy as a whole tend to be underrated so far.
U
ntil recently, East Asia was widely believed to
show the way of how to be among the winners of
globalization. In industrial countries, the "Asian tigers"
were considered a threat. High unemployment in
Europe was frequently attributed to Asia's attrac-
tiveness for foreign capital and the inroads of Asian
suppliers into world goods markets. Development
economists, including the present author, repeatedly
advised Latin America to learn from East Asia how to
sustain macroeconomic stability, how to integrate
successfully into the worldwide division of labor, and
how to attract foreign capital and gain access to
internationally available technologies.
1
Enthusiasm about East Asia's economic perfor-
mance has been replaced by panic. Some observers
interpret currency crises and financial turbulence as
indicating that East Asia is the first victim of the
globalization of markets and production.
2 Such
verdicts suggest that overshooting is a phenomenon
prevailing not only in international financial markets,
but also in the commenting upon acute crises. The
affected Asian economies may suffer from a con-
siderable setback in catching up economically with
advanced industrial countries; but the tremendous
rise in per-capita income achieved in the past
decades will not be wiped out. Annual GDP growth
was about 8 percent since the mid-1980s. During the
30 years preceding the crisis, per-capita income
increased tenfold in Korea, fivefold in Thailand, and
fourfold in Malaysia.
3 Yet, it was obviously false to
* Kiel Institute of World Economics, Kiel, Germany.
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assume that almost everything was different in Asia
and that this region was not prone to crisis.
Latin American Lessons
Developments that led to present difficulties in East
Asia should have been well known from previous
episodes of financial distress in Latin America. East
Asian governments, including external advisors,
essentially made the same mistake as Latin American
governments in the 1970s, namely not to look beyond
the national or regional domain. Ex post, it is quite
clear that governments could have prevented repeat-
ing the same mistakes made elsewhere before.
Asia now has to go the hard way to learn some
Latin American lessons." Most evidently, the risk of
speculative attacks increases if financial markets "con-
sider a country's currency to be overvalued. In Latin
America, real appreciation of the domestic currency
frequently resulted from inconsistent economic poli-
cies. Exchange rates were fixed as a nominal anchor,
while persistent fiscal laxity drove up prices of non-
traded goods. In several East Asian countries, over-
1 See, for example, Erich Gundlach, Peter Nunnenkamp:
Some Consequences of Globalization for Developing Countries,
Institute of World Economics, Kiel Working Papers 753, Kiel, July
1996.
2 "Schockwellen aus Fernost", in: Der Spiegel, January 19, 1998,
pp. 76-86.
3 Stanley Fischer: The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF. Address
at the Midwinter Conference of the Bankers' Association for Foreign
Trade, Washington, January 22, 1998.
4 For a detailed analysis of currency crises in Asian, European
and Latin American countries, see Markus Diehl, Rainer
Schweickert: Currency Crises: Is Asia Different?, Institute of
World Economics, Kiel Discussion Papers 309, Kiel, January 1998.
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valuation became an issue when governments
maintained the peg to the US-$, although the US-$
appreciated against other major currencies and East
Asia's export growth slowed down significantly in
1996.
Fragility of domestic financial systems adds to
vulnerability if speculative attacks occur. The concrete
manifestation of financial weakness may differ from
country to country. In Thailand, for example, essen-
tially unregulated operations of (non-bank) finance
companies constituted a major problem. In Korea,
government-directed bank lending and lack of
transparency resulted in nonperforming debt. The
common factor ignored by various Asian govern-
ments is that financial liberalization per se does not
ensure efficient financial intermediation. To the
contrary, financial institutions are inclined to take
excessive risk unless independent supervisory bodies
are established, prudential standards are enforced,
and the government is credibly committed against
guaranteeing private sector liabilities.
Moral hazard problems, though well known from
previous financial liberalization episodes in Latin
America, were largely neglected until the crisis broke
out in Thailand.
5 High domestic investment caught the
eye of many analysts and was - rightly - considered
an asset of East Asia relative to other regions. By
contrast, speculative investment ensuing from
incentive problems escaped professional scrutiny.
Imprudent lending fuelled booming real estate prices
in particular. Inflated real estate served as collateral
for further credit. The bubble burst when vacancy
rates for office space turned out to be considerable.
This was the beginning of a downward spiral. The
shrinking value of collateral exposed highly leveraged
financial institutions to liquidity problems. The follow-
ing credit crunch triggered a sharp fall in real estate
prices. For instance, prices of office space in Thailand
declined by about 30 percent during the second half
of 1997.
6
Furthermore, the structure of external financing
matters for currency risk and may add to financial
distress.- The Mexican "tequila" crisis of 1994/95
bears witness to the volatility of short-term capital
flows. Short-term capital is most easily withdrawn
from a country once foreign investors consider current
s Paul Krugman: What Happened to Asia?, January 1998, mimeo.
6 Estimates by Cushman & Wakefield, a Hong Kong-based
real estate consultant, as quoted in: Der Spiegel, January 12, 1998,
p. 77.
7 MarkusDiehl, Rainer Schweickert, op. cit, p. 27.
account deficits to be unsustainable. The expectation
of depreciation by some large investors may turn out
to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, particularly if the ratio
of short-term debt to foreign reserves is high. This
ratio approached 100 percent in Thailand and 150
percent in Indonesia, signaling a high vulnerability to
sudden changes in short-term capital flows.
7
Once foreign investors started to withdraw from
Asian host countries, another vicious circle set in.
Looming depreciation revealed the exposure of local
firms and banks to currency risk. Many banks had
raised short-term loans on international financial
markets for longer-term onlending to speculative do-
mestic investors. Anticipating that depreciation would
render the servicing of external debt more difficult,
borrowers tried to hedge liabilities by selling local
currency for foreign exchange. This added to ex-
change rate pressure and further undermined the
ability to service foreign debt. Panic has resulted in a
degree of devaluation far exceeding "any reasonable
estimate of what might have been required to correct
the initial overvaluation" of Asian currencies.
8
Managing the Crisis: The IMF Approach
All in all, Asian turbulences reveal striking simi-
larities to previous crises in Latin America. Exchange
rate pegs induced real appreciation and unsus-
tainable current account deficits. The sudden reversal
of short-term capital flows disclosed the fragility of
domestic financial systems. Collective action
problems led markets to overreact.
However, there are two important differences
between Asia and Latin America. First, except the
Philippines, East Asia cannot be blamed for unsound
macroeconomic management in the pre-crisis period.
In contrast to the Latin American syndrome of fiscal
laxity, fiscal policy in most East Asian countries is well
reputed for maintaining macroeconomic balance.
Public deficits were gradually reduced and converted
into surpluses in the early 1990s.
9 Second, savings
rates in East Asia were, on average, twice as high as
in Latin America in 1995 (Table 1). Among the Asian
economies mostly affected by the current crisis,
savings were low and declining only in the Philippines.
By contrast, among major Latin American economies,
only Chile reported a savings rate approaching the 30
percent mark.
' Stanley Fischer, op. cit., p. 2.
8 MarkusDiehl, Rainer Schweickert op. cit., p. 23.
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Table 1
Gross Domestic Savings in East Asia and












































1 High-income economies (Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore) not
included.
Source: World Bank: World Development Report 1997, Selected
World Development Indicators, Table 13, Oxford 1997.
The controversial issue is whether these differences
call for a cure to the East Asian crisis that is funda-
mentally different from traditional IMF conditions
imposed on countries in need of financial assistance
for overcoming internal and external imbalances. The
IMF argues that restoring confidence in the currencies
of East Asian countries was of first priority in
designing adjustment programs. To this end, the IMF
has asked for higher interest rates, fiscal restraint, and
financial sector restructuring:
• Higher interest rates shall stop the downward spiral
of currency depreciation. Korea, for example, had to
agree to an inflation target of 5.2 percent for 1998,
which is just slightly higher than the inflation rate in
1997. This requires "a brutal monetary squeeze",
1
0
considering that depreciation of the Won means rising
prices of traded goods. Short-term interest rates in
Korea jumped from 12.5 percent to 21 percent upon
the signing of the IMF program.
• Fiscal restraint is said to be necessary for
compensating the expected costs of financial sector
restructuring, and for restoring a sustainable current
account balance. Initial fiscal adjustment amounted to
3 percent of GDP in Thailand, 1.5 percent of GDP in
Korea and 1 percent of GDP in Indonesia.
1
1 Fiscal pro-
grams comprised higher taxes and reduced public
investment.
• Financial sector restructuring involves institutional
changes to strengthen financial regulation and super-
vision, and to increase transparency. Internationally
accepted practices related to capital adequacy
standards, accounting procedures and disclosure
rules shall be adhered to. Moreover, the IMF has
insisted on closing, down non-viable financial insti-
tutions, which is to let shareholders take their losses
and to prevent moral hazard in the future.
Critics of the IMF agree that the solution to the
Asian crisis is to restore confidence. However, it is
open to question whether IMF conditionality, as
outlined above, helps achieving this aim. Some
measures may even turn out to be counterproductive.
Appropriate Therapy: IMF under Attack
The IMF has met with considerable resistance in
Asia, notably in Korea. The IMF has imposed condi-
tionality, rather than aiming for "ownership" of adjust-
ment programs by countries in need of financial
assistance. Some of the measures forced on Asian
governments are beside the IMF's principal business
of restoring stability and stopping the drain on foreign
reserves.
1
2 For instance, Korea had to agree to
liberalize the import regime for cars. In the longer run,
this step may well be in Korea's own interest; but it is
hard to see how it helps to overcome acute balance of
payments troubles. It is suspected that the IMF raised
the issue of Korean car imports because it figured
high on the US administration's bilateral agenda. As a
matter of fact, the IMF's position in negotiations with
Korea was refined repeatedly after consulting US
officials.
Another delicate issue concerns the deregulation of
foreign banking in Asian financial markets. Again
controversy is mainly on the timing of reforms. Foreign
participation in banking may support financial restruc-
turing and help achieving internationally accepted
best practices. However, under conditions of financial
turmoil, foreign banks, if allowed in immediately, may
acquire local assets at seriously depressed prices.
This may add to public resentment against foreign
investors taking over domestic industries. The IMF
would have been well advised to take Asian pref-
erences into account in deciding on how to deal with
this dilemma. By insisting on quick financial liberali-
zation, the IMF nourished Asian feelings that the
hidden agenda in negotiations was to open doors for
foreign business.
1
0 Jeffrey Sachs: IMF is a power unto itself, in: Financial Times,
December 11, 1997.
" Stanley Fischer, op. cit.
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" "New illness, same old medicine", in: The Economist, December
13, 1997, pp. 79-80.
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Apart from failures in "selling" adjustment programs
to Asian countries, major elements of the IMF's
approach are under attack for economic reasons.
Debate centers on how to overcome the collective
active problem, since "there is no 'fundamental'




Wade and Veneroso suggest a solution that is radi-
cally opposed to IMF remedies." Instead of con-
taining inflation and raising interest rates, these
authors consider domestic inflation, causing real
interest rates to turn negative, to be the least costly
way of reducing current levels of debt. Their approach
requires a closed capital account. Wade and Vene-
roso argue that foreign savings are not needed in
Asian economies with high domestic savings rates.
Governments are advised to declare a moratorium on
foreign debt, and to spread the remaining costs of
financial cleanup among domestic savers. Rather
than letting local banks fail, governments are urged to
inject capital into the banks so that the latter can
resume lending to their customers.
This proposal rests on two questionable assump-
tions. First, the observation that Asian "household
savers have been content with the low rates they have
been getting"
1
5 is obviously meant to imply that
savings behavior will remain unaffected if real interest
rates turn negative. However, domestic agents would
have strong incentives to shift savings abroad in order
to avoid sharing the cost of financial consolidation.
Experience in various countries suggests that capital
flight may reach significant dimensions, even if capital
outflows are subject to control. Second, domestic and
foreign savings are far from being perfect substitutes.
In almost all East Asian economies, foreign direct
investment (FDI) accounts for a significant share in
overall capital inflows.
1
6 FDI tends to provide host
countries with a package of capital, market access,
managerial know-how and, most importantly, tech-
nology. This means that closing the capital account is
1
3 Stanley Sachs, op. cit.
1
4 Robert Wade, Frank Veneroso: The Asian Financial Crisis:
The Unrecognized Risk of the IMF's Asia Package, New York, January
1998, mimeo.
1
5 Robert Wade, Frank Veneroso, op. cit.
" For East Asia as a whole, (net) FDI inflows accounted for more than
half of total net resource inflows in 1995-1996; the corresponding
share was 39 percent for all developing countries; World Bank, Global
Development Finance 1997, Washington 1997.
Georg Koopmann/Christoph Kreienbaum/Christine Borrmann
Industrial and Trade Policy in Germany
The present study is part of a collaborative research project under the title "International Joint Research on the
Market Systems of the Three Economies", i.e. Japan, the United States and Germany. Project partners are the
Japan Research Institute, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, the HWWA
Institute for Economic Research, Hamburg, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. The
project aims at providing countries in transition and developing countries with a map of alternative routes for
their burdensome journey towards a well working market economy.
The focus of the project was on two major features of the market systems: Corporate Governance
(Schmidt/Drukarczyk/Honold/Prigge/Schuler/Tetens, Corporate Governance in Germany, 1997, ISBN 3-7890-
4623-X) and Industrial and Trade Policies. The present study deals with German industrial and trade policy
against the background of the current debate on Germany's quality as a business location, the country's under-
lying philosophy of »Ordnungspolitik« and market competition, Germany's membership in the European
Community, and the challenges posed by German unification.
1997, 162pp., paperback, 42- DM, 307,- oS, 39- sFr, ISBN 3-7890-4967-0
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not without cost, even if domestic savings are high.
Rather, it would become more difficult for Asian
economies to resume the process of catching up with
industrial countries, which critically depends on
access to technological innovations.
It appears more reasonable to involve all major
participants, including foreign investors, in a cooper-
ative solution to the collective action problem. This
approach calls for mutually agreed debt restructuring,
e.g., by means of prolongation of repayment profiles,
bridging finance and debt-equity swaps, rather than
unilaterally decreed debt moratoria. Actually, external
debt restructuring is now under way in the Asian
countries most seriously affected by the crisis.
However, the IMF could have contained panic much
earlier, by encouraging foreign creditors, both private
and public, to provide bridging finance when crisis
was looming. The fundamental strength of most East
Asian economies should have alleviated cooperation
along these lines.'
7
While the IMF's crisis management has been weak
and delayed on the part of foreign creditors, IMF
action is too strong on the part of domestic financial
institutions. Most critics concede the need for
financial sector reform in Asia. However, in the midst
of financial turmoil, it is difficult to decide which
financial institution should go under because of
imprudent lending. By definition, the panic-induced
liquidity squeeze has affected prudent banks, too.
Hence, the question is how to strike the balance in
preventing financial institutions that are in principle
viable from failing, while not protecting non-viable
institutions from the consequences of excessively
risky lending. Injecting capital into distressed banks,
or creating public agencies that take over non-
performing loans carries the risk of supporting all
banks, whether viable or not. Moral hazard may then
continue. However, pushing bankruptcy and, at the
same time, calling for monetary restraint, as done by
1
7 In this context, Jeffrey Sachs (op. cit.) argues: "A better
approach would have been for the IMF to stress the strengths rather
than the weaknesses of the Korean economy, thereby calming the
markets rather than further convincing them of the need to flee the
country".
1
6 IMF reasoning on moral hazard appears to be inconsistent.
Pushing bankruptcy of financial institutions in Asia implicitly means
that the IMF considers it "better simply to let the chips fall where they
may" (Stanley Fischer, op. cit., p. 5), and, thereby, discourage
moral hazard in the future. By contrast, the IMF is opposed to such a
solution when it comes to dealing with moral hazard of foreign
creditors. To quote Fischer again: "We could ... possibly teach
international lenders a lesson in the process; alternatively we can
step in to do what we can to mitigate the effects of the crisis ...,
although possibly with some undesired side effects. The latter
approach ... makes more sense".
the IMF, clearly exacerbates the collective action
problem rather than solving it. The IMF approach is




An orderly dealing with domestic debt might have
been possible within a reasonable period of time,
considering that most East Asian governments
followed sound fiscal policies. In these circumstan-
ces, austerity measures tend to result in recessionary
overkill. This view is widely shared among economists
outside the IMF. Even the chief economist of the
World Bank, Josef Stiglitz, has criticized the IMF for
forcing East Asian countries deeper into recession.
1
9
Higher interest rates, higher taxes and reduced public
investment are counterproductive if recession is
looming anyway.
In defending its case, the IMF maintains that higher
interest rates were necessary to reverse the process
of currency depreciation.
2
0 In principle, there is
nothing wrong with the idea to raise interest rates
temporarily in order to make it more attractive to hold
domestic currency. It is also true that companies with
substantial foreign debt are likely to suffer more from
persistent currency depreciation than-from a tem-
porary rise in domestic interest rates. As it seems,
however, the "debt mountain" largely consists of local




More importantly still, recent exchange-rate devel-
opments suggest that the IMF strategy has not
worked in major problem countries in East Asia. The
currencies of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand conti-
nued to plummet after these countries had agreed to
IMF adjustment programs (Table 2).
2
2 As a conse-
quence, the return of interest rates to pre-crisis levels
is not in sight. With the rise in interest rates turning out
to be long-lasting, rather than temporary, Asian
debtors are in the most uncomfortable situation: the
servicing of both foreign and domestic debt is
rendered extremely difficult. In other words, more
Asian firms and banks could have survived the crisis,
if the IMF had not insisted on harsh austerity
measures.
1
9 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 9, 1998.
2
0 Stanley Fischer, op. cit.
2
1 Robert Wade, Frank Veneroso, op. cit.
2
2 This may be partly because uncertainty remains whether Asian
governments will adhere to IMF conditions (Indonesia). Moreover, one
may argue that currency depreciation would have been even more
pronounced in the absence of IMF programs. Nevertheless, the
verdict on the IMF's approach is quite clear: the aim of halting the
downward spiral was not achieved.
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Risk of Contagion
Restoring confidence, the principal aim of the IMF's
crisis management, seems to be a good way off.
Problem countries in East Asia are the first to suffer, if
crisis is deepened and prolonged due to the remedies
applied. Yet, delayed recovery in these countries may
have far-reaching repercussions on other countries.
Contagion may spread to Asian neighbors that were
less affected so far, and possibly also to Latin
America. If so, the Asian crisis may have more serious
implications for the world economy as a whole than
currently expected.
Further contagion within East Asia may result from
close intra-regional trade and investment relations.
Trade among ten developing and newly industrializing
countries in East Asia accounted for 36 percent of
their total exports in 1995, compared with 23 percent
in 1985 (Table 3). Foreign direct investment (FDI)
relations among these economies expanded by
similar dimensions.
2
3 The increasing division of labor
among Asian neighbors, according to the so-called
"flying geese" pattern, supported East Asia's catching
up with more advanced economies in the past.
Lower-income countries participated in this process
since newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of the
first generation (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan) restructured production from labor intensive
and technologically standardized manufacturing to
more sophisticated industries. Second-generation
NIEs such as Malaysia and Thailand, but also
countries such as China and Vietnam, benefited from
relocation of industries in which the frontrunners were
no longer competitive.
The intra-regional division of labor is likely to be
disrupted if the countries in crisis will not recover
quickly. Developments in Korea are most relevant in
this regard. In terms of FDI outflows, Korea ranked
third (behind Hong Kong and Taiwan) among foreign
Table 2
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand: Nominal
Exchange Rates before and after IMF Agreement
1
before January 21, 1998
Table 3
Trade Relations within East Asia,















































1 Currency units per US-$. • January 7, 1998. " December 3, 1997.
= August 8, 1997.
Source: The Economist, Emerging Market Indicators, various
issues.
1 Share of exports to ten developing and newly industrializing
countries in East Asia in total exports of the countries listed; see
source for details of calculation.
Source: Sangkyom Kim: Europe-East Asia Trade Relations: An
East Asian Perspective, Korea Institute for International Economic
Policy, Seoul, October 1997, mimeo.
investor countries in developing Asia in the first half of
the 1990s.
2
4 Almost half of Korean FDI outflows were
invested in East Asia. In China, for instance, Korean
investments exceed investments made by Germany
or the United Kingdom.
2
5 Relocation of Korean manu-
facturing to neighboring countries with lower per-
capita income will probably be interrupted, if not
reversed, as long as the dramatic devaluation of the
Won persists. Though to a lesser extent, the same
applies to outward FDI by Malaysia and Thailand.
2
6
Trade represents the second channel through
which currency crises affect the intra-Asian division of
labor. Devaluation in today's problem countries
amounts to a pronounced shift in price competitive-
ness to the detriment of neighboring countries. The
latter are facing depressed export prospects in
trading with problem countries, and will become
subject to fiercer competition in both home and third
markets. The critical question concerns the policy
reaction of neighboring countries to deteriorating
trade balances. China is the crucially important player
in this respect.
2
3 UNCTAD: World Investment Report 1995, New York and Geneva
1995, p. 53, Table II.3.
" Inkyo Cheong: The Patterns for Europe-Korea Investment,
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Seoul, October
1997, mimeo.
2
5 Wen H a i: Europe-China Investment Relations, China Center for
Economic Research, Beijing, October 1997, mimeo.
2
6 For the pattern of outward FDI by various Asian countries, see
UNCTAD: Sharing Asia's Dynamism: Asian Direct Investment in the
European Union, New York and Geneva 1996.
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At first sight, it seems far-fetched to argue that
China may react by devaluing the Renminbi. GDP
growth, though considerably reduced, is expected to
remain fairly strong (around 7 percent) in 1998.
2
7 China
is less prone to speculative attacks since convertibility
of the Renminbi is restricted, the trade balance is in
surplus (1997: about 4 percent of GDP), foreign
reserves are high (about US-$ 140 billion), and short-
term foreign debt is rather low. However, China suffers
from serious internal problems that may ultimately
lead authorities to renege on earlier commitments not
to devalue. Restructuring of non-viable state enter-
prises will add to unemployment in the short run.
Concerns are that this process may result in social
unrest, if GDP growth falls considerably short of 8
percent. Furthermore, reduced GDP and export
growth will reveal the fundamental weakness of
China's financial system. Banks are burdened by non-
performing loans; the dimension of this problem is
estimated to exceed internal debt problems in most of
the Asian countries that are currently in financial
trouble.
2
8 Another similarity to today's problem
countries seems to prevail in the real estate sector.
Vacancy rates in major business centers are expected
to increase to 25 percent. As soon as real estate
bubbles burst, liquidity problems of banks and
companies will mount and China may experience a
credit crunch as did other Asian countries before.
Serious repercussions on other economies within
and outside Asia are almost certain, if internal tension
increases in China and the government changes
course by devaluing. India may be the next to
devalue, in order to avoid losing markets in which
China is a major competitor. Expectations are that
Hong Kong will have no choice but to abandon the
peg to the US-$ once China devalues.
2
9 Financial
turbulence in Hong Kong would possibly erode
foreign investors' confidence in all emerging market
economies. Internationally mobile capital will then
seek for the few remaining "safe havens" in industrial
countries.
It is mainly in this way that contagion may spread to
Latin America. Low and declining savings rates in
2
7 IMF: World Economic Outlook. Interim Assessment, Washington,
December 1997, p. 58; Deutsche Bank Research: Die Wahrungskrise
in Asien. Wachstumsdelle oder Ende des Wirtschaftswunders?,
Frankfurt a.M., December 1997, p. 10.
2
8 Deutsche Bank Research, op. cit., p. 10. In addition to non-per-
forming bank loans in the order of US-$ 200 billion, inter-enterprise
debt among Chinese state firms is estimated at US-$ 100 billion.
2
8 Deutsche Bank Research, op. cit., p. 11.
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major Latin American economies (Table 1) suggest
that dependence on foreign capital inflows is higher in
this region than in Asia. FDI inflows, for example,
represented more than 10 percent of gross fixed
capital formation in Latin America in 1985-1995,
compared with about 8 percent in developing Asia.
3
0
In contrast to Asia, foreign savings have tended to




In comparison with external financing, trade effects
of the Asian crisis on Latin America are likely to be
modest. Direct trade effects would amount to about
0.4 percent of Latin America's GDP, assuming that all
developing Asia will expand exports to Latin America
by 20 percent and reduce imports from Latin America
by 20 percent.
3
2 However, particular industries, such
as labor intensive production of footwear and textiles




Financial repercussions of further Asian turbulen-
ces on Latin America are most likely in Brazil.
3
4 This
country had to fight a first speculative attack in
October 1997. In defending the exchange rate of the
Real, Brazilian authorities sold almost 15 percent of
foreign reserves and raised interest rates to almost 40
percent in real terms (on an annual basis). Another
attack may occur at any time, although inflation is
down to 5 percent, the domestic financial system
appears to be relatively stable, FDI inflows are
booming, and foreign reserves are still high (end-
1997: about US-$ 52 billion). The Real is widely
considered to be overvalued by about 20 percent, and
Brazil runs a twin deficit in the public budget and the
current account in the order of 4-5 percent of GDP.
International financial markets may anticipate that the
Brazilian government will change course and allow for
3
0 UNCTAD: World Investment Report 1997, New York and Geneva
1997, Annex Table B.5.
3
1 "Latin American Finance", in: The Economist, December 9, 1995.
3
2 This is a fairly pessimistic scenario, even though indirect trade
effects ensuing from improved competitiveness of Asian competitors
in third markets are ignored. Note that the "tequila" crisis reduced
Mexico's imports by just 10 percent. Moreover, the assumed changes
include trade with Asian countries that do not have major difficulties
so far. The calculation is based on GDP and trade figures for 1995; cf.
IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, Washington 1996.
3
3 Ricardo Pacheco, Peter Nunnenkamp: Wirtschaftliche
Integration auf Kosten peripherer Regionen? Chancen und Risiken fur
den brasilianischen Nordosten im Mercosur, Institute of World
Economics, Kiel Working Papers 827, Kiel, August 1997, pp. 21-22.
3
4 This paragraph draws on Peter Nunnenkamp: Brasilien - das
"Land der Zukunft" vor der Krise?, Institute of World Economics, Kiel,
January 1998, mimeo; see also Deutsche Bank Research:
Lateinamerika und die asiatische Finanzkrise, Frankfurt a.M.,
December 1997.
INTERECONOMICS, March/April 1998IMF
a larger devaluation of the Real after the elections in
October 1998.
Growth forecasts for Brazil in 1998 have been
reduced already to approximately 1 percent of GDP.
3
5
Under present conditions, growth prospects appear
to be much better for neighboring countries in Latin
America. But Brazil will drag its neighbors down, if the
country is pushed into a major devaluation. Argentina
will be affected in the first place since trade relations
with Brazil have further increased with proceeding
Mercosur integration.
Implications for Industrial Countries
Significant contagion within and outside Asia
clearly represents a worst-case scenario. But the
course of events must not be exactly the way
sketched out above for the Asian crisis having
considerable worldwide effects. For instance, foreign
investors may turn their back on emerging markets as
a whole, even if China stays on course and the Hong
Kong-Dollar remains pegged to the US-$. After their
enthusiasm was frustrated in East Asia, foreign
investors may reconsider similar risks in other regions
and reveal a preference for "safe havens".
3
6
This implies that assessments according to which
the Asian crisis will affect industrial countries only
moderately, are subject to considerable downside
risk. Simulations run by the IMF support this view.
Baseline projections take a "cautiously optimistic
view" on the depth and duration of the Asian crisis
and its world trade effects.
3
7 Accordingly, deviations
between post-crisis and pre-crisis projections on
GDP growth in 1998 remain modest (Table 4).
3
8
Among industrial countries, only Japan would be
affected significantly since trade with developing Asia
accounts for a higher share of GDP in Japan than in
Europe and the United States. In the case of "a
substantially more pronounced and prolonged
cutback in capital flows to emerging markets",
however, output in industrial countries is expected to
decline, relative to the baseline projection, by about
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Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook, December 1997, p. 52.
0.7 percentage points;
3
9 i.e., GDP growth in 1998
would be further reduced from 2.4.to 1.7 percent.
Moreover, adverse GDP effects would no longer be




In addition to trade effects, the Asian crisis affects
creditor banks in industrial countries. Japan's fragile
financial system, in particular, is expected to receive
another blow from non-performing loans in devel-
oping Asia.
4
1 Concerns mounted when Japanese
authorities found out in January 1998 that the burden
of non-performing loans is almost three times larger
than estimated before.
4
2 In an attempt to ease liquidity
constraints, Japanese financial institutions may sell
assets held abroad, primarily US bonds, thereby




The vulnerability of Japanese banks to credit risk in
Asia is particularly large since 56 percent of their
claims vis-a-vis all foreign borrowers (outside the
reporting area of the Bank for International Settle-
ments) is concentrated in the five major crisis
countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and
Thailand), compared with slightly less than 20 percent
in the case of European and US banks (Table 5). With
concerns being focused on Japan, the strong invol-
vement of European banks in East Asia escaped
attention until recently. Outstanding claims of Euro-
3
5 The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Report: Brazil, 4th
Quarter 1997, London 1997, p. 8; Deutsche Bank Research, op. cit.
(note 34), p. 2.
3
6 For a similar line of reasoning, see IMF, op. cit. (note 27), p. 76.
17 For details on different scenarios and underlying assumptions, see
IMF, op. cit. (note 27), pp. 51 ff.
3
8 The financial press has reported projections by other institutions,
including OECD and Goldman Sachs, suggesting similar conclusions.
3
9 The additional reduction in capital flows is assumed to reach a
magnitude of US-$ 100 billion, i.e., almost 2 percent of GDP of all
emerging market economies.
4
0 Europe, Japan and the United States would be affected to a similar
extent in this scenario since trade with non-Asian emerging markets
accounts for a higher share of GDP in Europe and the United States
than in Japan.
4
1 Deutsche Bank Research, op. cit. (note 27), p. 13.
" "Faule Kredite in Japan fast dreimal so hoch wie angenommen", in:
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 14, 1998.
4
3 Robert Wade, Frank Veneroso, pp. cit.., p. 11. However, this
factor may be cushioned, or even overcompensated, by foreign
investors revealing a stronger preference for placing capital in "save
havens".
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(1) percent of claims of all reporting banks vis-a-vis borrowers listed in the front column;
(2) percent of claims of European, Japanese and US banks, respectively, vis-a-vis all borrowers outside the reporting area.
' Comprising banks from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, and United Kingdom.
 2 Offshore banking centers (Hong Kong and Singapore) not included.
Source: Bank fur internationalen Zahlungsausgleich, Gliederung der internationalen Bankkredite nach Falligkeiten, Sektoren und
Nationalitat der berichtenden Banken. Erstes Halbjahr 1997, Basle, January 1998, Table 2.
pean banks in the five crisis countries indeed slightly
exceeded outstanding claims of Japanese banks in
mid-1997.
4
4 French, German and UK banks financed
in large part the rise in developing Asia's foreign debt
from US-$ 338 billion in mid-1996 to US-$ 389 billion
in mid-1997. The decision of Deutsche Bank in late
January 1998 to write off about 15 percent of claims
outstanding in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand indicates that bank profits in Europe may




In summary, the Asian crisis and possible con-
tagion within and outside the region involves
considerable risk for the world economy as a whole.
The depth of the crisis has to be attributed to the
sudden shift from enthusiasm to panic. Hence, the
critical issue is to restore confidence. Of course, the
Asian countries mostly affected have to play their part
in this regard. Domestic financial systems have to be
put on a sound footing, by improving supervision and
enforcing prudential standards. In addition, Asian
governments may offer better opportunities for debt-
equity swaps and may encourage FDI inflows. At
present, the recessionary impact of IMF conditionality
constrains Asian governments in overcoming the
crisis. Countries are rather pushed deeper into crisis.
" European and Japanese banks held 36 and 35 percent, respec-
tively, of all reporting bank's claims vis-a-vis this group of countries,
whereas the share of US banks was below 10 percent.
1
5 The write-off of claims in the order of DM 1.4 billion represents
almost a quarter of Deutsche Bank's profits in 1996; cf. "Deutsche
Bank trifft milliardenschwere Vorsorge fur Krisenlander in Asien", in:
Suddeutsche Zeitung, January 29, 1998, p. 19.
4
3 IMF, op. cit. (note 27), p. 59.
This verdict, which is widely shared by professional
economists, leads to the conclusion that the IMF must
overhaul and revise its approach in dealing with Asia.
Governments of industrial countries, too, have an
important role to play in restoring confidence.
Simulations suggest that downside risk can be
reduced substantially by larger international financial
support (i.e., limiting the cutback in capital flows to
emerging markets) and with monetary policy in
industrial countries responding "with a somewhat
more accommodative stance".
4
6 In these circumstan-
ces, the decline in GDP growth in both emerging
markets and industrial countries is likely to diminish
considerably and economic recovery could be
expected to occur more rapidly.
In any case, industrial countries have to accept a
deterioration in their current account for some time.
Put differently, they must not impede Asia's
adjustment process. Especially the United States
should refrain from reducing bilateral trade deficits
with countries in crisis, by extorting trade con-
cessions from these countries. Protectionist demands
will intensify once Asia starts economizing on
devalued currencies and expands exports to indu-
strial countries. While writing these conclusions, news
are that German shipbuilders are complaining about
impaired price competitiveness ensuing from the
Asian crisis, and are requesting from Asia to reduce
production capacity in shipbuilding. Such demands
have to be firmly resisted. The Asian crisis perse may
not drag the world economy into deep and prolonged
recession. A revival of protectionism almost certainly
would.
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